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Response 
 
Leigh Bercaw 
 
 
Last semester I walked to school through one of the toughest neighborhoods in the capital city of 
Madagascar. Every morning my friends and I passed the same gang of sleeping street-children—
honestly the best word for it is puppy pile. They were a shivering, shifting heap of children, and 
they broke my heart. On the way home from school, they were awake and I was afraid of them. 
If I walked alone, they would surround me and steal everything in my pockets. They eventually 
pulled one of my friends to the ground and took her backpack. As a student of anthropology 
trained to approach multifaceted issues by looking first through the lens of the particular, these 
kids, for me, embody the complexity of the lives of children living in difficult situations. They 
inspire our compassion and move us through their vulnerability. Yet, they simultaneously remind 
us that they are agents in their own right. 
   I am honored and humbled to engage in an exchange about children’s resilience and 
vulnerability with Mr. Tonderai Chikuhwa. His experience in the field with children in conflict 
dwarfs my own; yet the themes in his essay demonstrate that there are parallels between our 
experiences. One characteristic of vulnerable children that he too has encountered is their 
embeddedness in the societies they come from—the issue of children becoming soldiers did not 
occur spontaneously, but is reflective of greater global trends of human insecurity. In a world 
where malnutrition, poverty, and environmental crises are increasingly trans-state organisms, 
child soldiers are part and parcel of the changing state of human security. In his essay, Mr. 
Chikuhwa proposes that the violations being perpetrated against children constitute a legitimate 
threat to international peace and security. He details the work the United Nations Security 
Council has done to prosecute transgressions on children’s rights and proposes that the Security 
Council continue to systematically and purposefully engage in interventions for children in 
armed conflict. His essay is an example of a passionate and grounded argument for increased 
international intervention on behalf of compromised children. 
   The implications of humanitarian intervention through the Security Council merit 
investigation, however. In my response, I intend to further the discussion by examining the 
changing nature of humanitarian aid and questioning its role in protecting vulnerable children. 
The nature of human security is changing. Humanitarian aid intervenes on behalf of populations 
that survive in multi-state conflicts and economies. Children should be protected because they 
represent the future—but the consequences of maladaptive humanitarian interventions form the 
societies we leave to them. 
   In this response, I will begin by examining how populations in conflict blur state boundaries in 
the pursuit of human security. Then I will demonstrate the transformation of humanitarian aid 
working in a climate of trans-state conflict. I will illustrate some unintended consequences of a 
humanitarian aid system that oversteps state sovereignty under the banner of urgent action. Last, 
I will conclude by inquiring into the symbolic use of vulnerable children as humanitarian 
motivators. 
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I.  Unraveling Boundaries: Characteristics of the Global Community 
 
To understand the phenomenon of child soldiers one needs to begin at the level of the individual; 
to understand their personhood in their social context.1 What are the forces that affect the 
security of an individual in a conflicted state? Civilian involvement in warfare goes beyond 
landmines; their very livelihoods are woven into the international economy. In her ethnography 
on international crime networks, anthropologist Carolyn Nordstrom introduces the concept of the 
“extra-state.” She proposes that societies in the 21st century have broken the fragile boundaries 
of the state in favor of extra-state economies of transnational, informal networks characterized as 
“economies of war based on pillage.”2 In Nordstrom’s depiction of sub-Saharan Africa, modern 
warfare restructures the economy in that “ the business that transports people, equipment, and 
commodities often rely on military-controlled travel.” The factors that propel economies—
“airplanes and vehicles…are always military matters.” The military involvement of child soldiers 
is representative of the militarization of their societies—the humanitarian response has been 
reshaped in response to human security being embedded in these militarized states. 
   Humanitarian aid is part of the balance of international power systems. It represents one 
society’s recognition of human security transgressions in another society. Insecurity at the level 
of the individual is heavily tied into economic power. To some extent insecurity is intrinsic to the 
capitalist system. As anthropologist Thomas Eriksen explains: 
 
The entrepreneur fares like everybody else in the age of neoliberalism, which 
values freedom so highly but neglects security. Whenever one has success, the 
range of options and the scope of personal freedom feels fantastic, but the 
moment one hits the wall, freedom is reinterpreted as insecurity…the 
entrepreneur becomes an anomaly the moment he fails to succeed.3 
 
In the context of a globalizing economy, developing nations are the entrepreneurs that risk 
human insecurities to engage in this economy. And when this insecurity is apparent on the 
national scale, humanitarian aid intervenes with urgency. 
   Humanitarianism is faced with several contradictions: how to adapt the use of force at the scale 
of the individual and how to engage at the level of the state without feeding extra-state 
economies. Child soldiers are one of the manifestations of the increased militarization of 
civilians and simultaneously one of the most obvious breaches of human rights. Aid 
organizations are working in the context of the extra-state yet governed by the bureaucracy and 
militarization of the state. To mediate this, militarized powers like the U.N. Security Council 
have evolved as technical and strategic tools in the name of human security. Militarized 
humanitarian aid acts to correct outwardly perceived insecurities while the groups that determine 
what insecurities need addressing and how they should be addressed are part of the constant 
negotiation of global power systems. 
 
II.  “The Duty to Intervene”: Humanitarian Aid as National Security 
 
In her critique of modern humanitarian intervention, anthropologist Chowra Makaremi 
characterizes human security militarization as “legal utopianism,” or the “aspiration to transcend 
governments in the name of the common good of humanity.”4 To exemplify this, Makaremi 
quotes Kofi Annan defining the modern state as “the servant of its people, and not vice versa” 
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and explains that “when states do not prove responsible to their population…if they fail to 
provide for their human security, the international community has the responsibility to free this 
population from its irresponsible governors through an intervention.”5 
   Transgressing state sovereignty was not originally the intention of the development-focused aid 
system; in the early 1990s, the “right to intervene” was created for the short-term purpose of 
creating “humanitarian corridors” that would serve the good of the people above the interests of 
the states. However, by the late 1990s, after the defeat of U.N.-led humanitarian interventions in 
Somalia, problems in Bosnia, and failure in Rwanda, human security was redefined from 
economic insecurity to “a concern of safety and protection from violence.” Infringement on state 
sovereignty in the name of human security has resulted in the remilitarization of humanitarian 
interventions—which were originally designed as the demilitarized approach to security.6 In the 
process of legalizing this militarization, the passionate discourses questioning the “duty to 
intervene” have been lost. In official documents from the U.N. Commission for Human Security, 
“freedom from want and freedom from fear” are the common denominators of human security. 
Under these definitions, human security interventions are part of the “project of modernity,” as 
“man imagines himself free from fear when there is no longer anything unknown.” What is lost 
when the project to eliminate insecurity operationalizes national sovereignty? 
   As is argued in Chikuhwa’s essay, the extension of U.N. Security Council policy to allow 
militarized interventions into conflicts involving children is part of a larger aid system that, in the 
words of Makaremi, “erodes the concept of state sovereignty in the name of enforcing 
humanitarian standards of safety wherever necessary.” 7 In the context of global power systems, 
who decides when intervention to enforce safety is necessary? On what basis are these decisions 
made? The unintended consequences of human security interventions become an even higher-
stakes game in the context of Nordstrom’s extra-state economic trade systems, in which 
redistribution of aid resources along corrupt government lines are widespread. In reframing child 
soldiers as a threat to security that merits widespread intervention, Chikuhwa opens the door to a 
body of interventions justified by vulnerability. In the context of international power systems, 
humanitarian aid becomes the management of global disorder as a goal of national self-interest.8 
 
III.  Symbols of Vulnerability: Child Soldiers as Humanitarian Motivators 
 
In the realm of intervention in the name of human security, why do the rights violations of a 
child soldier merit more action than the rights violations of a starving child? If intervention is 
justified by the protection of children as our future, then why are children embroiled in political 
violence more likely to be damaging to the future than children embroiled in structural violence? 
A child soldier is psychologically damaged by the atrocities forced upon him or her, but the 
damaging effects of malnutrition on a child begin in utero. Why does violence prompt us to act 
when other kinds of global vulnerabilities prompt, at best, detached compassion? 
   In critiquing U.N. Security Council disarmament of child soldiers, I am not advocating the 
continued use of children in warfare, but rather suggesting a humanitarian aid system that targets 
the systems that manifest in human insecurities—certainly the systems that contribute to food 
insecurity share similarities with the systems that create child soldiers. A society in which 
children are forced to kill, submit to sexual violence, and are torn from their communities cannot 
stand. Yet transgression of state sovereignty in the name of a common good cannot remain 
unquestioned, particularly when the common good is defined by the interests of a select group of 
states. 
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IV.  Conclusion 
 
According to Makaremi, “the issue now facing human security intervention is how to adapt the 
use of force to a situation where lives matter.”9 I interpret this as the conundrum of effective and 
educated humanitarian military intervention when the cost of delayed action is literally human 
lives. The work of Tonderai Chikuhwa is invaluable; as a Senior Advisor at the United Nations 
he has done illuminating and courageous work identifying massive breaches of human rights and 
proposing relevant and timely intervention. Through a decade of work in humanitarian aid, he 
has become a force for systems change.  
   The academic community, in turn, must respond in a way that problematizes system change to 
create solutions that integrate the context of globalizing power dynamics and extra-state 
economic systems. While Chikuhwa has done his job so effectively that he is a force in 
reshaping the way the U.N. Security Council engages with vulnerable child populations, I cannot 
respond in turn with a humanitarian aid solution that does not compromise state sovereignty or 
feed into international systems of corruption. Luckily, I am part of an academic network greater 
than myself; doubtless the Macalester community has something to say about the issue, so I turn 
the conversation over to you. Is there a humanitarian aid system that can address not only the 
vulnerable child soldiers and displaced children that Chikuhwa discusses, but also the vulnerable 
street children that I encountered in Madagascar? In some sense, all children are vulnerable. Is 
humanitarian intervention the right tool to address global child vulnerability? How can the 
response to child vulnerabilities be met both effectively and with some urgency? I thank the 
Macalester Community—in particular Tonderai Chikuhwa as part of the Macalester 
Community—for the opportunity to ask these questions. 
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